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Abstract 
The latest controversy to emerge in Australia’s ever-changing superannuation system is the 
failure of the proposed ‘member choice of fund’ legislation. While superannuation choice 
continues to be widely supported, the debate lacks coherent policy direction. This paper 
addresses the policy hiatus by developing a framework to systematically examine 
endogenous and exogenous constraints affecting the achievement of informed choice, 
members’ choice preferences and associated policy resolutions. Applying this framework, 
we argue that a genuine choice of fund model should cater for active and passive choice, 
where passive choice applies to fund members who, for various reasons, are unwilling or 
unable to make active choices. Appropriate education programs and standardised disclosure 
are identified as critical prerequisites to enable informed choice by those members who want 
to actively participate in the management of their superannuation savings. To protect the 
interests of passive choice members, we suggest the option of a government-regulated 
universal default fund (UDF).  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The latest controversy to emerge in Australia’s ever-changing superannuation system 
is the recent failure of the ‘member choice of fund’ legislation. Superannuation choice issues 
were raised by the Coalition Government in the mid 1990s when it was contended that 
government had a responsibility to simplify the superannuation system and, ensure fund 
members have access to greater flexibility and more choice of superannuation fund 
investments (Short 1996). At that time most occupational funds did not compete for 
members, relying instead on government mandate to operate as a monopoly (Gallery, Brown 
and Gallery 1996). Offering choice has been promoted as a positive policy option, giving 
members more control over how their superannuation savings are managed, increasing 
competition in the superannuation industry, which in turn, is expected to result in an increase 
in members’ benefits (ISC 1998).   However, we argue that there are significant constraints 
in achieving informed choice for all super fund members.  
In this paper we develop a framework to examine endogenous and exogenous 
constraints affecting the achievement of informed choice, conceptualise members’ choice 
preferences and provide associated policy resolutions. Applying this framework, we argue 
that a genuine choice of fund model should cater for active and passive choices, where 
passive choice applies to fund members who, for various reasons, are unwilling or unable to 
make active choices. To protect the interests of passive choice members, we recommend the 
option of a government-regulated universal default fund (UDF).  
2. BACKGROUND ON SUPERANNUATION CHOICE  
Australian employer-sponsored superannuation schemes have operated traditionally 
with little or no choice available to employees regarding which scheme they join, the types 
of benefits (defined benefit or accumulation) provided, or alternative investment strategies 
for their savings. The Federal Conservative Government sought to change this situation with 
their policy to provide employees with a choice of superannuation fund. The Government’s 
choice of fund policy was originally announced during the 1996 election and then formally 
presented the details of its choice of fund proposals in the 1997 Budget (SSCS 1998). In its 
report on the inquiry into the Australian financial system, the Wallis Committee also 
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recommended that superannuation fund members should have greater choice of fund (Wallis 
1997). The primary objective of the Government’s policy “was to provide greater freedom of 
choice for superannuation contributors and greater competition between funds”, which is 
expected to lead to “reduced costs and increased returns” (SSCSFS 2000, para. 1.1). 
Choice of fund legislation was first introduced to Federal Parliament in December 
1997 and underwent several iterations of amendments. During the development of the 
proposed legislation there was considerable debate and controversy about the model (type 
and form) of choice that is appropriate within the Australian superannuation system. A 
consensus could not be reached and ultimately, on 8 August 2001 the Senate rejected the 
Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Bill 1998. The 
major political parties support the concept of choice, but ideological differences appear to 
influence their preferred choice model.1  
Although the choice of fund legislation failed, choice remains a relevant issue for 
superannuation. Prior to the Government’s initiative to legislate for between-fund choice, 
many superannuation funds were already offering their members choices by allowing them 
to choose an investment strategy from a limited range of options.2 The Choice Bill provided 
added impetus for superannuation fund trustees to offer more choices to members during the 
three and a half years that the Bill was ‘on the table’. In particular, the choice debate focused 
attention within the superannuation industry on fund performance, and consequently, many 
funds began to offer varying levels of choice to their members.  
Given that superannuation fund members increasingly face choices, many critical 
issues associated with choice remain unresolved. In particular, informed choice is dependent 
on members’ motivation and ability to exercise choice, the financial expertise of members, 
and adequacy of disclosure of superannuation fund information.  
3. A FRAMEWORK FOR SUPERANNUATION CHOICE  
While government mandates compulsory superannuation savings through 
Superannuation Guarantee (SG) contributions, the system is situated wholly within the 
                                                 
1  The Labor Party opposes between-fund choice and instead advocates within-fund investment choice (Senate Hansard, 8 
August, 2001, p.25822). The Democrats were in fact prepared to support the proposed legislation but as a trade-off for 
their support demanded that the Government address the issue of same-sex couple rights to access superannuation 
benefits (Senate Hansard, 8 August 2001, p. 25831).  As the Government was not prepared to concede to the Democrats 
demands, the Bill was defeated.   
2  In 1996-97, 11% of non-retail funds offered their members investment choice (ISC 1998).   
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purview of the private sector. There are several issues in relation to superannuation ‘choice’ 
in this context. First, government does not underwrite vulnerabilities of the system, except 
by enacting legislation to re-regulate following market failure. The protection of members’ 
retirement benefits becomes reliant on a set of checks and balances that have been shown to 
be inadequate. The regulatory environment is largely aimed at ensuring superannuation 
providers meet their fiduciary obligations. Government action in this regard has been largely 
reactive to repair anomalies and correct abuses to the system. Second, the notion of public 
interest is unable to be invoked satisfactorily in relation to those who are less powerful 
stakeholders in a private sector-based superannuation system. Balancing the interests of a 
range of wage earners with those of shareholders and other institutional players is 
problematic in a private market context where concern for the ‘bottom line’ takes precedence 
over social and equity considerations. Third, there is an assumption that the provision of 
education programs will enable employees to make better choices in relation to the 
superannuation system. However, we argue that while education in superannuation matters is 
an important consideration, education alone cannot solve all the issues faced by employees 
with regard to an increasingly complex superannuation system. Other endogenous and 
exogenous constraints that hinder employees’ choice decisions need to be addressed before a 
genuine choice model can be successfully implemented that will enable workers to maximise 
their retirement income. Figure 1 presents a framework of superannuation choice outlining 
the concept of genuine choice. 
As shown in Figure 1, the primary objective of superannuation fund members is to 
maximise their retirement income. In a choice environment, achievement of this objective is 
heavily reliant on members making informed choices. However, a range of endogenous and 
exogenous constraints imposes limitations on informed choice. Endogenous constraints 
include such factors as members’ unwillingness or inability to become informed and ‘risk 
transfer costs’ such as the cost of becoming informed, the cost of not becoming informed and 
the cost of making a wrong choice. Exogenous constraints arise from information 
asymmetries between fund members and fund trustees and other agents involved in the 
investment management and administration of the superannuation fund, leading to severe 
moral hazard problems.  
Given these constraints, a genuine choice of fund model would cater to both those 
members who want to make an active choice and those who prefer not to exercise that 
choice. That is, genuine choice concerns the right to make an active choice to participate in 
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decisions about investment of superannuation savings or to choose to opt out of this 
decision-making process. For those who choose active choice, a range of mechanisms 
regarding disclosure and education are needed to support achieving informed choice. For 
those who choose to opt out, providing a government-regulated universal default fund would 
ensure that members’ benefits are secure and their interests are protected. In this context, a 
choice of fund model should offer unlimited fund options together with a secure universal 
default fund. We argue this represents genuine choice.  
   5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy 
resolutions 
Universal 
default fund 
- Regulatory intervention   
- Disclosure standards  
- Education program  
Members’ 
objective 
Maximise 
retirement 
income 
 
Informed choice 
Exogenous constraints:  
- Information asymmetries  
- Regulatory failure 
 
Member decision 
problem 
Endogenous constraints: 
-Inadequate financial expertise 
- Member disengagement 
- Risk transfer costs 
 
Members’ 
choice 
preferences  
Active 
choice 
Passive 
choice 
Figure 1 Superannuation Choice Framework 
   6
 
4. ENDOGENOUS CONSTRAINTS ON INFORMED CHOICE  
Endogenous constraints are those that are employee specific and as a consequence, 
differentially affect employees when faced with a choice decision. They include inadequate 
financial expertise, member disengagement, and risk transfer costs (costs to members).  
4.1 Inadequate financial expertise  
A certain level of financial literacy is essential to evaluate and monitor performance 
of alternative superannuation funds. In choosing a superannuation fund, members are faced 
with the tasks of examining, comprehending and evaluating an array of fund information to 
assess their relative merits. This process includes evaluating the nature of each fund’s 
investment strategy, investment portfolio, and the expected investment risks and expected 
returns to determine the best match to members’ risk-return preferences. Two additional 
complexities faced by members are the various fee structures (entry, exit, management, 
investment fees) and potential effects of those fees on net returns, and comparative value of 
additional products offered, such as life and disability insurance. Many superannuation fund 
members do not have the financial knowledge or skills to perform such tasks. For example, 
ABS statistics show that 46% of Australians have “unsatisfactorily low levels of literacy” 
and 15% are “functionally illiterate” (SSCSFS 2000, para.4.16). AMP Financial Services 
suggested that the implication of this is “that there is going to be a percentage of the 
population who will never understand the concepts involved” (SSCSFS 2000, para.4.16). In 
the absence of impartial advice, these fund members are unlikely to benefit and, in fact, risk 
being worse off in an unregulated choice system.    
The Government, superannuation industry and community groups recognise the need 
for a ‘fund choice’ education program. However, the amount and source of program funding 
represents a major obstacle to providing effective member education. In the Senate Select 
Committee on Superannuation (SSCS) Choice of Fund report the Government Senators 
acknowledge the role of government in educating members. Nevertheless, it is anticipated 
that the private sector (the superannuation industry) will play a significant role in the process 
(SSCS 1998, para. 14.2). According to the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 
(ASFA) the estimated education budget needed to prepare existing members for a choice 
   7
environment would be in the vicinity of $40 million, and half of this amount should be paid 
by government (SSCSFS 2000, para. 4.28).3  
A major concern about the superannuation industry dominating the education process 
is the danger that it will become a marketing exercise by superannuation providers (as 
occurred in the U.K.) rather than providing a genuinely independent and objective education 
program. The U.K. experience is a lesson in how large numbers of employees can be lured 
away from sound company pension plans by unrealistic promises, and as a result suffering 
“considerable financial detriment” (SSCS 1998, para. 11.4.). Furthermore, in the absence of 
ongoing government funding, the need for updating members on the frequent and often 
complex changes to superannuation and investment products is likely to be increasingly 
assumed by the superannuation industry in pursuing the industry’s vested interests. Even if a 
member education program is adequately funded, an objective education program is 
implemented, and members are willing to participate in the program, it will still take a 
considerable period of time to bring members up to an adequate level of financial expertise.4 
Moreover, member education in superannuation matters will necessarily be ongoing and the 
issue of the associated significant costs and who bears those costs has not been addressed in 
the choice debate.  
In combination, these obstacles do not augur well for the general expectation that all 
members have the capacity to develop and maintain sufficient expertise on an ongoing basis 
to make an informed superannuation choices.   
4.2 Member disengagement 
The effectiveness of a superannuation choice system and any associated education 
program is limited by the extent of participation by fund members. When faced with the 
complex investment decisions inherent in a superannuation choice system, individual 
attitudes towards participation are likely to vary considerably. Those who choose to avoid 
participation will remain effectively disengaged from the process.  
Braithwaite and Braithwaite’s (2000) ‘enforcement pyramid’ model is useful in 
conceptualising the continuum of superannuation fund members’ attitudes to superannuation 
                                                 
3  This estimated budget is unlikely to address the shortcomings of member’s basic literacy and numeracy skills.  
4  According to AMP Financial Services, “if the experience in the U.S. is a guide, it would take in the order of 10 to 15 
years for the population to reach a stage of financial literacy” (SSCSFS 2000, para. 4.34).  
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fund choices.5 Braithwaite and Braithwaite (2000) argue that education, persuasion and 
understanding can work to secure a willingness to comply with regulation imposed by the 
taxation system. However, those categories of wage earners who are either resistant to 
complying, or have become disengaged from the process will only comply in a system of  
‘command regulation’ (Braithwaite and Braithwaite 2000). Applying this concept to the 
‘superannuation choice’ context, it is erroneous to assume that all superannuation fund 
members are able and/or willing to develop their skills to a level sufficient to exercise 
informed choice.  
Member disengagement already represents a major problem for retirement income 
for many Australians. Statistical and survey findings provide considerable evidence of 
widespread disengagement within the superannuation system. Changes to labour market 
structures contribute to the problem of disengagement in that the growth of casual jobs has 
increased the risk of workers losing track of their superannuation entitlements. For example, 
a survey conducted by ASSIRT and Challenger International found that up to 50% of 
workers are unsure of which fund their superannuation contributions had been directed 
(Lampe 2001). Similarly, an earlier Newspoll survey found that 64 percent of fund members 
had little or no knowledge of their funds. Further, only a quarter of fund members read some 
or all of the annual fund report, and only 43 percent of those were able to recall some 
information detailed in the report (Kavanagh 1998).   
A possible reason why members become disengaged and are slow in taking up 
available choices is because they “would not be generally interested in investment choice 
until they have accumulated a reasonable balance in their accounts” (SSCSFS 2000, para. 
8.23). This is evident in three interrelated areas associated with multiple small balance 
holdings, namely small account balances, lost members and unredeemed superannuation 
guarantee vouchers. 
A survey of 153 funds in 1995 found that those funds held 1.4 million accounts with 
small balances, which represented 35 percent of the membership of those funds (Fletcher, 
1995, p.43). It is likely that since then the small accounts balances problem has grown and 
                                                 
5 Braithwaite and Braithwaite’s (2001) model of an ‘enforcement pyramid’ demonstrates that there are a range of differing 
attitudes to tax compliance, and consequently, a range of corresponding strategies that should be deployed to deliver the 
required tax paying outcomes. Potential taxpayers are categorised from ‘willing’ to ‘averse’, and the compliance 
strategies vary from ‘voluntary’ to ‘enforced’.   
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remains an issue due to statutory protection of balances in such accounts.6  According to a 
review of the SIS legislation, there are still concerns among fund trustees and administrators 
regarding costs and equity issues associated with small balances (Productivity Commission 
2001, p.66). Related to the small account balances problem is the issue of lost members. 
There are currently around 4 million accounts on the ATO’s lost members register, which 
represent about 18% of total superannuation accounts, containing about $5.5 billion; this 
represents close to $1,400 per account (Productivity Commission 2001. p.66).  
As at April 2001 the Australian Tax Office (ATO) held $96 million of 
superannuation payments, representing 403,273 superannuation fund entitlements in the 
form of Superannuation Guarantee vouchers7 not redeemed by employees (SSCSFS 2001a). 
This figure represents 36% of the total value of vouchers issued. These data represent a 
significant amount of forgone savings and, importantly, forgone superannuation earnings for 
workers. Moreover, in cases where the vouchers were redeemed, the ATO found that 50 
percent of voucher recipients do not understand the purpose of the voucher or what they 
needed to do with it (SSCSFS 2001a). While education is an important element of bringing 
the existence of unredeemed vouchers to the attention of workers, the approach of issuing 
vouchers then requiring workers to ‘cash in’ those vouchers by converting to a 
superannuation fund is unnecessarily complicated and involves a myriad of different 
schemes.  
Both the number and total value of unredeemed SG vouchers is continuing to grow. 
Based on ATO statistics (SSCSFS 2001a), the average amount of unredeemed vouchers is 
$238 compared with claimed vouchers averaging $426. This again highlights the problem of 
small balances that often leads to workers being separated from their superannuation. This is 
likely to differentially affect workers, impacting adversely on those who are vulnerable in 
the labour market, including atypical working arrangements, marginalised industry sectors 
and itinerant workers. Clearly, the unredeemed vouchers issue illustrates a significant level 
of member disengagement which would be further exacerbated in an unregulated choice 
environment if left unresolved. In the absence of ‘command regulation’ to safeguard their 
                                                 
6  Under the SIS legislation trustees are required to protect members’ benefits with balances less than $1,000. This 
protection is either to charge no admin fees while the small account is held by the fund, or to roll over the small account 
to an Eligible Rollover Fund or the Superannuation Holding Account Reserve (SHAR) operated by the ATO.  
7  Enforcement action taken by the ATO against employers who fail to make SG contributions includes collection of the 
unpaid contributions and holding them in the form of a ‘voucher’ until the members to whom the entitlements belong can 
be found.   
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superannuation benefits, wage-earners who have become disengaged from the complex 
superannuation system are vulnerable to exploitation and mismanagement of their 
superannuation savings and are likely to remain disenfranchised from the system.   
4.3 Risk transfer costs  
Evidence shows that many members when given opportunities to make a 
superannuation investment choice fail to exercise the choice.8 A common conclusion is that 
the failure to exercise choice is due to a lack of skills, education, capacity or desire to make a 
choice about their investments.9 However, remaining with a ‘default’ option may in itself be 
a deliberate member choice. For example, in a study of choice by Australian academics, 
Brown, Gallery, Gallery and Guest (2001) found that ‘risk transfer costs’ rather than 
knowledge explained many members’ decisions not to exercise choice.  
The Brown et al. (2001) findings reveal that when faced with the decision to choose 
between a defined benefit plan (DBP) and an employer sponsored accumulation plan (with 
investment options) many members opted to remain in the DBP to avoid incurring the costs 
associated with the accumulation plan. In DBPs, sponsoring employers promise to provide a 
certain level of benefits when employees retire (or otherwise cease employment). 
Accordingly, employers bear the risk that benefits will cost more than expected (actuarial 
risk) and the risk that invested plan assets will generate insufficient returns (investment risk); 
employers thus effectively underwrite the plan (IASC 1996).   
In contrast, the obligation of employers sponsoring accumulation plans is limited to 
an agreed contribution rate, and thus an employer’s liability to provide promised benefits is 
discharged when periodic contributions are made to the plan. Members’ benefits in 
accumulation plans comprise contributions and investment returns, which means that 
members bear the actuarial and investment risks. Additionally, members incur the costs of 
becoming sufficiently informed for the purposes of making the initial choice and ongoing 
monitoring costs. Such costs include the time taken to acquire, read and interpret relevant 
material, attend training sessions, and to seek professional advice from financial experts.  
Thus, in accumulation plans (the most common offered in Australia), the recurring 
costs associated with actuarial risk, investment risk, investment selection, and monitoring, 
                                                 
8  Jacques Martin Industry Funds Administration provides administration services to superannuation funds with a total of 
approximately 2.6 million accounts. Most of the funds offer investment choice but only about 15,000 members made a 
deliberate choice (SSCSFS 2000, para. 8.7). 
9  See for example the comments by Senator Hogg, Senate Hansard, 8 August 2001, p.25827.  
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effectively transfer to the fund member. In a choice environment (where the choice is 
between fund/investment options within accumulation plans), these ‘risk transfer costs’ will 
be continually reassessed by fund members in their decision models and only where the 
benefits justify the cost will a switch be executed. For example, a fund member’s decision 
rule may be to stay in a default fund and avoid the risk transfer costs until the fund’s return is 
below the mean yearly return for funds in a similar risk-return category. If this occurs, the 
member then switches to alternative investment option and chooses to incur the associated 
risk transfer costs in exchange for the expected additional returns. From a member 
perspective, the choice option has a value which will increase with the available investment 
options, the frequency that choice can be exercised, and will decrease with any switching 
costs charged to the member.10  
5. EXOGENOUS CONSTRAINTS ON INFORMED CHOICE  
The three types of endogenous constraints discussed in the previous section impact on 
fund members to varying degrees. Even if all these constraints can be effectively addressed, 
the exogenous constraints of information asymmetry arising from multiple agency problems 
remain a pervasive problem confronting all employees in a choice environment. These 
problems are compounded by regulatory failures in the extant regulatory regime.  
5.1 Information asymmetry and multiple agency problems  
Much of the complexity in the superannuation system arises from the web of inter-
relationships among various participants within the system. From an agency perspective, 
fund members are the principals with trustees acting as their agents. Trustees are responsible 
for managing and safeguarding superannuation assets on behalf of members until such time 
as members cease employment and become eligible to receive superannuation benefits. 
Trustees frequently engage other agents, such as investment consultants, external 
administrators and fund managers to assist with the management of the fund’s assets. 
Additionally, under SIS legislation, trustees are also required to engage auditors to conduct 
financial and compliance audits at least annually.  
                                                 
10  Consistent with option pricing theory (Black and Scholes 1973, Smith 1979), the choice option has a value which is 
clearly recognised by many fund members. For example an ASSIRT Investor Market Trends Survey found that 83% of 
investors considered the choice-of-fund legislation to be a good or great idea (“Investors endorse choice of fund”, 
Superfunds, June 2000, p.5).  
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These layers of agents give rise to multiple agency problems (Lakonishok, Shleifer 
and Vishny 1992, Gallery et al. 1996) in which the monitoring of agents in complicated by 
substantial information asymmetry. For example, if a fund’s actual performance is below 
members’ expectations, the cause of the poor performance may be due to the failure of one 
or more of the agents.  That is, failure may be due to trustees' poor choice of investment 
consultant, the investment consultant's poor recommendations in the selection of fund 
managers, the fund managers' sub-optimal selections of investments in their portfolios, 
inferior company management (in the case of equity investments), or any combination of the 
above. Although trustees are ultimately responsible for fund performance, information 
asymmetry arising from the multiple agency relationships provides trustees with 
opportunities to distance themselves from disappointing investment returns by blaming 
advisers and fund managers for poor decisions (Gallery et al. 1996).11 In a choice 
environment where investment decisions transfer to members, trustees and other agents have 
additional opportunity to shift blame for poor investment decisions to members. That is, the 
principals (members) bear the associated risk transfer costs for their poor investment 
decisions.12 
Information asymmetry resulting from agency relationships clearly presents a major 
moral hazard to fund members. As in all agency relationships, effective monitoring and 
control mechanisms are necessary to mitigate the costs arising from this moral hazard 
problem. These costs include agents reducing effort, shirking their responsibilities, excessive 
remuneration, and over-consuming perquisites (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Jensen and 
Meckling 1976, Fama 1980). However, many of the common control mechanisms that have 
arisen in capital markets to minimise agency costs are not evident in the current 
superannuation system (Gallery et al. 1996).13  Fund members’ major mechanism for 
mitigating agency costs is through the threat of terminating the services of agents for 
                                                 
11 Similarly, Lakonishok et al. (1992) suggest that multiple agency problems explain why U.S. pension fund sponsors prefer 
to employ external fund managers who adopt ‘active’ investment strategies. This preference persists despite evidence that 
active management leads to net returns below passive benchmarks. Australian evidence is also consistent with 
superannuation fund trustees preferring a similar approach to active fund management and incurring the associated costs 
and lower returns. (See Sawicki, 2000; Sawicki and Ong, 2001, Drew and Stanford, 2000, 2001).   
12 This ability to transfer some responsibility for poor investment decisions to members may partially explain why the 
superannuation industry has been voluntarily introducing limited investment choice.   
13 These measures include performance-based remuneration contracts between shareholders and managers, the threat of 
dismissal of managers, the threat of takeover, and the threat of bankruptcy, which may lead to managers risking job loss 
and damage to their reputation in the managerial labour market. 
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unsatisfactory performance.14 Consequently, effective performance monitoring by fund 
members is critical, but performance monitoring depends on the adequacy of the information 
disclosed by agents.  
5.2 Disclosure of Adequate Information 
Protection of members’ superannuation interests under the prudential framework of 
the Australian superannuation system relies “... on a well informed membership with the 
right to participate in managing the affairs of their fund” (Dawkins 1992, p. 1). Disclosure of 
adequate and appropriate information enables members to exercise influence over the 
direction their fund takes and evaluate its performance (Dawkins 1992, p. 13). Importantly, it 
is the quality of financial information disclosures that is fundamental to effective decision-
making.   
The Australian accounting conceptual framework identifies ‘relevance’ and 
‘reliability’ as the two primary qualitative characteristics that financial information must 
possess to be useful for economic decision-making (AARF 1990, para. 7). Information is 
considered relevant if it enables decision makers to evaluate past outcomes and form 
predictions; it should also assist with assessing the rendering of accountability by preparers 
(AARF 1990, para. 8).  To be reliable, financial information needs to faithfully represent, 
without bias or undue error, the underlying transactions and events that have occurred 
(AARF 1990, para 16).  To be relevant and reliable, information selected for disclosure 
needs to be comparable and understandable (AARF 1990, paras. 31-38). A constraint on the 
relevance of information is timeliness in that information loses relevance if its disclosure is 
unduly delayed (AARF 1990, para. 39).15  
Based on these qualitative characteristics, it is evident that current financial 
information disclosures by superannuation funds are inadequate for members’ choice 
decision making. In particular, an absence of standardised performance measures renders the 
rates of return and other performance ratios reported by funds as unreliable and not 
comparable. Moreover, access to relevant information on fund performance is subject to 
                                                 
14  Even this mechanism has limitations as superannuation fund members have little or no power to remove non-performing 
trustees, and in a limited choice environment, costs and restrictions imposed on investment choice may deter fund 
switching despite poor performance. 
15 These qualitative characteristics are consistent with Breyer’s (1982) view that disclosure is likely to be effective only 
where the users can understand the information disclosed, where users are free to make choices on the basis of that 
information, where users believe the information is materially relevant to their choices, and where it has been transmitted 
to users in a simple and meaningful way.  
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delays and is largely confined to the member’s own fund due to limited availability of 
information about other funds (Gallery 1994; Gallery et al. 1996).  
Standardisation of measuring fund performance information arose as a critical issue 
early in the choice debate. It has been suggested that the presentation of investment returns 
and fees and charges should be heavily standardised to enable comparisons between funds 
(SSCS 1998, para. 6.14).  However, the (then) Insurance and Superannuation Commission 
(ISC) indicated reluctance to mandate standardised measures of performance through 
regulation. While the ISC (1997) strongly supported the voluntary performance reporting 
standards developed by the Australian Investment Management Association (AIMA) for 
wholesale investment managers,16 it did not propose to incorporate such standards into 
regulation. Rather, 
… the ISC considers it preferable to rely on market pressures rather than 
legislative intervention to maximise compliance with such standards. … 
[M]aking the standards mandatory, through regulations, could introduce an 
unwarranted degree of inflexibility into the ongoing development and 
application of the standards.  (ISC 1997, para. 62) 
 
This ‘leave it to the market’ approach means that existing variations in the way that 
investment return information is measured and disclosed in superannuation fund reports will 
continue to lack comparability. Added to this problem are concerns about a lack of 
uniformity in disclosures of management fee information. Guidelines for calculating the 
management expense ratio (MER) to facilitate comparisons of fees have been developed by 
the superannuation industry. However, because MERs can be calculated differently and can 
include or exclude a wide range of fees, MERs are not comparable among different funds 
(Mace, 1998).17 Consequently, in the absence of standardised measures of fund investment 
returns and fees, members are presented with information about alternative funds that has 
been derived in a variety of ways. These inadequacies in disclosure of financial information 
highlight the significant information asymmetries evident in the current system which, in 
turn, impose severe limitations on informed choice.18   
                                                 
16  The Investment and Financial Services Association (IFSA) has similarly developed investment return reporting standards 
for retail funds.   
17  One commentator suggests that given the doubts that professionals have about MERs, they are of little use to the average 
fund member, likening them to “studying trigonometry tables” (McIlwraith, 1998, p.24).   
18  Disclosure by superannuation funds has also been subject to more general criticism. For example, in his comments about 
the prospect of administration fees rising as a proportion of investment returns, Kohler (2001, p.23) states that because 
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5.3 Regulatory failure 
Ideally, regulations should address market failures such as problems of information 
asymmetry but regulation may fail if it is poorly designed and implemented leading to costs 
that exceed benefits. In a choice environment, regulatory failure represents a constraint on 
members’ ability to make genuine choices. The current system attempts to protect members 
but fails to do so because it is reliant on members actively participating in the system. 
Because there is no opportunity for members to opt out of the decision making process, the 
regulatory system fails to take account of the endogenous constraints on members’ choice. In 
particular, it fails to recognise that many members do not have the necessary skills or 
willingness to monitor and keep track of their superannuation savings. As a consequence, the 
regulations have failed to protect the superannuation benefits of large numbers of workers 
who are particularly vulnerable. The specific problems that regulation is not adequately 
addressing are lost members, small accounts balances and the SG voucher system.  
The combination of the lost members and small account balance problems has led to 
an undesirable situation where there are increasingly large numbers of unconsolidated 
accounts with a substantial cumulative total of funds which is generally poorly invested. The 
ATO is concerned about the “ballooning” number of lost members (SSCSFS 2001a, para. 
5.17), but it appears that little is being done by the ATO, State Governments or the industry 
to reunite members with their lost superannuation savings (SSCSFS 2001a).19  
In a review of the Superannuation Guarantee, the Auditor-General identified a number 
of concerns including a lack of a prosecution strategy for SG avoidance, a high number of 
unredeemed vouchers and the need for developing better coordination mechanisms (ANAO 
2000). This finding points to the failure of the educative process to alert superannuation fund 
members to their entitlements. Employees do not earn interest on funds associated with SG 
vouchers until they are redeemed, and lapse if not redeemed within 10 years (SSCSFS 
2001a). Added to this problem is the issue of employers’ failure or unwillingness to set aside 
funds to contribute to employee superannuation as part of the requirements of the SG. It is 
argued that the systemic effects of complexity and long chains of implementation, together 
with employer recalcitrance and ineptitude combine to subvert the original intention of a 
better retirement income for many workers. The Auditor-General’s review warned that the 
                                                                                                                                                       
disclosure standards in the superannuation industry are “so woeful … only the most attentive and sophisticated fund 
members will know what is happening”.  
19  The growth in lost members is exacerbated by employers inappropriately using the SHAR as a default fund to avoid 
administrative costs associated with collecting employee information and finding a suitable fund (SSCSFS 2001a).  
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failures of the SG system threatened the government’s intention to ‘reduce reliance on the 
age pension as a means of funding retirement for individuals’ (ANAO 2000, p.15). 
6. MEMBERS’ CHOICE PREFERENCES – ACTIVE AND PASSIVE  
Simply introducing choice without addressing the endogenous and exogenous 
constraints is likely to exacerbate existing problems and result in further undesirable 
outcomes for both fund members and the superannuation system. While choice is widely 
regarded as desirable, the system needs to cater to both those individuals who want to 
exercise choice and those who prefer to opt out of an active decision making process. 
Accordingly, a ‘true choice’ model should recognise the diversity of fund members’ choice 
preferences. That is, some fund members want to actively participate in the management of 
their superannuation savings and so prefer to exercise ‘active choice’. On the other hand, 
others prefer not to actively participate, choosing instead to allow third parties to manage 
and monitor their superannuation entitlements. This choice, whether implicit or explicit, 
represents ‘passive choice’. It is important to recognise that a passive choice does not imply 
that those members do not want choice. Members are likely to want an option to exercise 
active choice in the future and the value of the option could increase as the endogenous 
and/or exogenous constraints diminish (e.g. as the amount of the superannuation investment 
increases, member’s financial expertise increases or members approach retirement).    
The choice model would then encompass a two-pronged approach to superannuation 
fund management and policy which provides opportunity for both active choice and passive 
choice. Accordingly, policy resolutions need to be cognizant of both of these choice 
preferences.20   
7. POLICY RESOLUTIONS  
Providing members with choice of fund is an important step in ensuring that the 
superannuation industry operates efficiently and members exercise greater control over their 
superannuation savings. In relation to the active choice option, the key constraints on 
informed choice are inadequate disclosure standards and financial expertise. To overcome 
these constraints, we argue that disclosure standards need to be improved prior to 
                                                 
20  A broader view of choice gives consideration to allowing low-paid workers to choose to opt out of the superannuation 
system by receiving immediate wage payments instead of superannuation benefits in the future (Davidson 1995, ACOSS 
1996). Whilst this view has merit, there are a range of eligibility factors that need to be analysed, such as income 
threshold and interactions with the taxation and social security systems. This aspect of superannuation choice is beyond 
the scope of this paper and represents an area for future research. 
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implementation of an appropriate education program. Regarding the passive choice option, 
we suggest that the establishment of a universal default fund will effectively overcome many 
of the problems associated with member disengagement.  
7.1 Disclosure standards 
During the debate over the proposed choice legislation, the Labor Party flagged the 
need for the development of an accounting standard as part of the choice regime to enable 
proper comparisons of fees and charges between funds (Davis 2000). The ACTU has 
similarly called for standardised disclosure of financial information by superannuation funds 
(Superfunds, June 2000 p.9). Submissions and evidence given to the SSCSFS roundtable on 
choice of superannuation funds emphasised that a standardised disclosure regime is an 
essential pre-condition for informed choice (SSCSFS 2000). The Institute of Actuaries of 
Australia suggest that as a minimum, there needs to be standardised disclosure of fees, 
charges and investment returns and a common reporting date, without which “it will not be 
possible for consumers to assess the comparative performance of different funds, and 
effectively measure and evaluate effects of costs measures against returns” (SSCSFS 2000, 
para 4.10). As discussed earlier, much work has already been done by the industry in 
developing standards for reporting investment returns and management expense ratios and 
this could provide the basis for establishing legislated standards.  
Standardised measures of expenses and returns would logically be included in 
existing financial reporting regulation governing disclosures by superannuation funds. As 
such, the accounting standard AAS 25 “Financial Reporting by Superannuation Plans” could 
incorporate standardised performance measures that superannuation funds have to disclose in 
their audited accounts. Consistent with uniform disclosure of performance measures by 
companies (e.g. as required by AASB 1027 “Earnings per Share”), similar standardised 
performance disclosures could be established for the superannuation industry.  Indeed, the 
overall benefit is likely to significantly exceed the additional reporting costs. 
AAS 25 is currently under review21 and, in anticipation of this review, the SSCSFS 
(2001b, para. 6.33) expressed an expectation that standardisation issues, such as the 
definition of ‘administration expenses’, would be addressed by the review. Unfortunately, 
the exposure draft of the proposed revised standard does not include any reference to how 
standardised expense ratios or investment returns should be measured. Thus there appears to 
                                                 
21  In July 2001 the Australian Accounting Standards Board issued an exposure draft of a revised version of AAS 25.  
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be little progress towards ensuring that key information about fund performance is 
standardised so that members have comparable information on which they can rely to make 
informed choices. Unless standardised measurement of performance ratios are established, 
within-fund and between-fund comparisons are unreliable and consequently informed choice 
is severely restricted.22  
7.2 Member education program 
Historically, an education program has been the vehicle for ensuring that citizens 
comprehend the system of superannuation. In 1989 the Labor government stated that an 
education program would be implemented to ensure the community understood the benefits 
of superannuation savings (Howe 1989). Since that time governments have assumed 
unproblematically that better education would lead to better understanding and engagement 
with the superannuation system. However, it is argued that with each iteration of the changes 
to the superannuation system, either through greater regulation or offering different choices, 
has required more active decision-making and subsequently created higher risks to 
accumulating or maintaining members benefits.     
The nature and scope of appropriate member education is contingent on the capacity 
and willingness of members to exercise choice. As discussed previously, a genuine choice 
model would cater to the needs of those members who want to actively participate in market-
based decisions and those members who prefer to opt out of the choice decision because they 
do not have the proficiency and/or are unwilling to make the decisions. Attempting to force 
superannuation education on all members irrespective of their choice preferences would 
clearly be unproductive in relation to substantial numbers of members. Therefore, an 
appropriate education program needs to be targeted to those who are prepared to actively 
engage in decisions regarding the management of their superannuation savings. Such a 
program needs to be ongoing and delivered by parties independent of any vested industry 
interests.  
7.3 Universal default fund (UDF)  
Proposals for a government-run National Superannuation Fund have been raised at 
various times but have never been brought to fruition (Paatsch and Smith 1992). Although 
there are indications that substantial numbers of people would prefer the government to 
                                                 
22  In the absence of choice decisions, disclosure of standardised performance information is still necessary to enable 
members to make valid within-fund and between-funds comparisons, given that disclosure represents a key prudential 
control in the Australian superannuation system.  
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manage their superannuation rather than private sector funds,23 neither the present Coalition 
Government nor the former Labor Government have canvassed government-managed 
superannuation as a possibility. The management of the superannuation system has always 
been the province of the private sector (Gallery et al. 1996). Given that government has been 
prepared to mandate superannuation savings, it is incumbent on the government to provide a 
‘safety net’ for those compulsory savings to address the constraints and risks associated with 
a fully privatised pension system. Establishing a universal default fund for superannuation 
members if members are unable or are unwilling to exercise choice may alleviate such risks. 
In this case, there is a responsibility on government to facilitate passive choice by providing 
a fund that that is secure and preserves superannuation entitlements throughout working 
careers.  
Under the Government’s proposed choice of fund legislation, superannuation 
contributions would have been directed to a default fund if members did not nominate a 
fund. The SSCS (1998, para. 8.24) highlighted the importance of ensuring “that default 
funds protect the interests of employees who are unable to protect their own long-term 
interests”. Given the likelihood of “significant numbers” of members not choosing a fund,24 
“there is a strong case for setting minimum standards for default funds” (SSCSFS 2000, 
para. 6.1). However, the Investments and Financial Services Association argued that such 
standards would work against underlying competitive pressures (SSCS 1998). This suggests 
that the objectives of protecting members’ interests and market competition are 
irreconcilable. A viable alternative is to establish a universal default fund (UDF) to cater for 
those members who are unable or are unwilling to make informed choices.  This is justifiable 
for two reasons.  First, given that workers are forced to save for their retirement through 
superannuation, the government has an obligation to protect the savings of vulnerable 
members who are incapable or are unwilling to manage those savings themselves. Second, as 
the fundamental purpose of mandatory superannuation savings is to reduce future 
dependence on the age pension (SSCS 1998), it is in both the government’s and taxpayers’ 
interests to ensure that those savings are not frittered away due to poor fund choices.  
                                                 
23  For example, a 1998 survey of 2,400 householders found that 23% of all respondents, and 29% of respondents with an 
annual household income of $40,000 or less, prefer a government-managed superannuation fund (Valenzuela & Webster, 
1998).    
24  Based on experiences of within-fund investment choice and other surveys of consumer attitudes to superannuation, the 
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia suggests that as many as 50 to 70 percent of consumers will not want 
to make an active choice (SSCSFS 2000, para. 6.4).  
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In addition to the provision of an increased level of security, the introduction of a 
UDF would resolve or alleviate many of the serious problems inherent in the current system. 
First, being broadly based, the UDF could serve as a repository and accumulation fund for 
members’ funds that cannot be managed economically by existing private-sector funds. The 
UDF would consolidate multiple small account balances and allow members to more 
effectively monitor investment performance. This would obviate the need for the 
involvement of the ATO for the management of these funds as a temporary custodian and 
alleviate the problems of member protection and lost members. In effect, consolidation of 
accounts would reduce administrative costs and remove cross-subsidies within existing 
funds.  
Second, with the UDF’s potentially large pool of funds there is a possibility of 
providing benefits and services to members that are currently available to members in some 
of the larger industry funds. Such benefits may include low-cost death and disability 
insurance and lower-cost financing. Third, the UDF could provide a benchmark for 
measuring the performance and accountability of all other funds. The UDF would be 
expected to provide model operating and disclosure standards which would allow close 
public scrutiny of performance and regulatory compliance. As a consequence, considerable 
pressure would be placed on all other funds to be more competitive, ultimately benefiting all 
superannuation fund participants. Importantly, a government-regulated universal default 
fund will assist in fulfilling the government’s obligation to ensure that compulsory 
retirement savings are secure, accessible and equitable.  
In combination, a standardised disclosure regime, appropriate member education and 
the option of a government-run default fund are more likely to lead to an environment where 
‘informed choice’ is achievable, relative to the haphazard and much criticised approach 
presently advocated by the Federal Government.   
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